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7. (Confidential - GLC) In response to his call yesterday I called Trip Mosbacher, on the White House staff, and gave him a limited rundown on L. Fletcher Prouty and some aspects of his book entitled "The Secret Team: The CIA and Its Allies in Control of the United States and the World" drawn on a review by Walter Pforzheimer as an aide-memoire. I made it clear to Mosbacher that in view of the various limitations places on the Agency from a variety of sources, I was providing this information on the basis of Prouty's contacts with CIA and on comments given me by others about Prouty's book. Mosbacher said he scanned the book last night and our comments agreed with his conclusions and information from other sources.

8. (Unclassified - PLC) George Gilbert, Legislative Reference, Office of Management and Budget, called and inquired as to the status of our position to State's reply to Chairman Fulbright, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on S. Res. 94. I informed Gilbert that I had furnished our oral concurrence to State's position on 12 September 1973, to Bill Breidenbach, of Gilbert's office. I explained at that time Breidenbach said our call would suffice and that no written reply was necessary.

9. (Secret - LLM) Met with Jim Woolsey, Senate Armed Services Committee, and gave him a package entitled, "Follow-up Requirements for Senate Armed Services Committee," which he reviewed and said satisfied the follow-up requirements of Mr. Colby's appearance before executive session of the Committee on 16 November concerning [redacted] allegations. Senator Symington has not yet decided whether to print the hearings, but if they are we will be given an opportunity to review and sanitize. Responding to his request, I told Woolsey that material on the "Jack Anderson leaks" and [redacted] is in Volume III, "Documentation Provided by CIA," which the Committee possesses.

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10. (Unclassified - RJK) Margaret Russing, on the staff of Senator James Buckley (R., N.Y.), called to ask for a publication entitled, "People's Republic of China: International Trade Handbook." It was obtained through [redacted] OCI, and mailed to the Senator's office.

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THE SECRET TEAM: THE CIA AND ITS ALLIES IN CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD. By L. Fletcher Prouty. Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1973. 496pp.

Dr. Sherman Kent once remarked about Andrew Tully's CIA: The Inside Story that it was "the worst bad book" he had ever read. That accolade can now easily be passed by this reviewer on to The Secret Team: The CIA and Its Allies in Control of the United States and the World by Colonel L. (for Leroy) Fletcher Prouty, Colonel, U.S.A.F. (ret). This book, with its pretentious title, consists of 426 pages of text and another 50 odd pages of appendices. Reading it is like trying to push a penny with one's nose through molten fudge. To make matters worse, the type is small and the margins are small; if there were ever any editing attempted on the text, it is not apparent, for otherwise the book would be less than half its present length, if it were lucky. The publishers announced a first printing of 10,000 copies and are prepared to issue a second printing. If there are 10,000 people in the United States who can get through this book from beginning to end, this reviewer will be amazed.

As a writer, Colonel Prouty is a stylistic nightmare. Paragraphs do not hang together; thoughts, if any, do not come through very well; and, if he wins any prizes at all, it will be for repetitiousness. Attempts to check out his "facts" indicate that, in many instances, he had the barest nodding acquaintance with them. Assuming that Prouty took no classified documents with him and has had not access to official files, he has had to rely on his memory years after the incidents he tries to describe, and his memory betrays him often.

Colonel Leroy F. Prouty (the L. Fletcher seems to be a post-retirement development) was a regular Air Force officer who, in 1955, was a Lt. Colonel in the Special Activities Branch, Directorate of Plans, U.S.A.F. Subsequently, he was a member of the staff in the Office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA) in the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In these assignments, he was the Focal Point Officer for contact by the CIA on matters pertaining to military support of some of the Agency's paramilitary programs. His work with the Agency largely concerned logistics, cover and funding, and he had a small staff to assist him. He held these positions from 1955 until 1963, retiring from active duty as a full Colonel in the latter year.

In his relations with CIA, Colonel Prouty was initially quite cooperative, but, as time progressed, his actions reportedly became more of a hindrance than a help. Reasons for this seem to vary. Some people allege that Prouty felt the Agency had not given him sufficient backing for his

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promotion to full Colonel, the rank he ultimately achieved. This was primarily an Air Force problem, not CIA's. Others feel that Prouty resented the fact that he wasn't an "insider" on Agency operations; that he was only a support man from whom much operational data was concealed for security reasons or his lack of "need-to-know." Opinions vary as to how bright Colonel Prouty really was, but there seems to be no question that, in his position in the military, he carried considerable clout. He has been referred to by an associate as "the only three-star Lieutenant Colonel in the Air Force." Another senior military officer described him as "a boy genius who didn't have the humility of ignorance."

From the standpoint of security, Colonel Prouty's book runs very close to the edge. Much of what he writes concerns events and operations which were once highly classified but are now history, and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to make any case against him that would stand up in court. He is very chary in using any names of CIA personnel. The dust wrapper on the book notes with seeming pride that "Not being a CIA man, he was exempt from taking the oath of secrecy." The blurb adds that "Being the Focal Point Officer put him in a very privileged position ... ." That he has abused this "privileged position" there can be no doubt; that he has distorted many of the events and conditions he describes does him no honor as an officer. His subsequent writings and TV appearances are in the same vein.

What is "The Secret Team" of which Colonel Prouty writes? One can best recount Prouty's own definition given in his first chapter (pp. 2-3):

> "The Secret Team consists of security-cleared individuals in and out of government who receive secret intelligence data ... and who react to those data, when it seems appropriate to them, with paramilitary plans and activities ... At the heart of the Team, of course, are a handful of top executives of the CIA and of the National Security Council ... It is often quite difficult to tell exactly who many of these men really are ... All true members of the Team remain in the power center whether in office with the incumbent administration or out of office with the hard-core set. They simply rotate to and from official jobs and the business world or the pleasant haven of academe ... it is a bewildering collection."

But his main villains never change; these include Allen Dulles, (far and away the top "villain" whom Prouty has called "a scheming opportunist"), aided and abetted by such CIA "controlled" persons as General Maxwell Taylor (whom Prouty calls a "Judas goat"), and McGeorge Bundy.* Compared to them, Prouty must believe the Kremlin was staffed by angels! Thus, Prouty's

* Prouty has added another name to his list. In the October 1973 issue of the new left magazine, Ramparts, he writes that General Alexander Haig "owes much of his career to his CIA connection"!

writings fall both into the "kiss and tell" and conspiracy theories of history, as the personnel of the "Secret Team" some big, some small, wend their way (mostly illegally in Prouty's view), planting their people throughout the Government and perusing their alledgedly nefarious schemes throughout the world.

Space does not permit this reviewer to rebut all of the wild fantasies, reckless charges and errors about the CIA with which this book abounds. Just for the record, however, let us look at a few of them. In Part IV: "The CIA: Some Examples Throughout the World," Prouty devotes eight chapters to "kiss and tell."

In chapter 17, Prouty discusses an incident which caused a flap at the time - the case of the C-118 cargo plane which was shot down off course in Soviet Armenia on 27 June, 1958. His account of the incident contains a good many mistakes. He commences by stating that the navigator of the plane was new in this area of the world. This is wrong, for there was a master navigator who knew the area well was on board, as well as a navigator trainee. However, the plane encountered storms and bad weather which resulted in a navigational error placing the plane about 130 miles off course, and, as its flight route to Teheran normally brought it within about 50 miles of the Soviet border, the navigational error was serious.* Suffice it to say that MIG aircraft shot at and hit the left wing tank of the C-118, setting the plane on fire. Five of the crew bailed out, and the remaining four flew the plane on to an unfinished Soviet airstrip. Those who bailed out received brutal treatment from the Soviet peasants as they landed, although of course Prouty doesn't mention it. In one case, a noose had been thrown over a telephone pole and was about to be affixed around the neck of one of the crewmen when he was rescued by the Soviet militia. The whole crew, when they were rounded up, were taken to the MVD Headquarters in Baku, where they were given surprisingly light interrogation until their release on 7 July, 1958. Prouty is in error when he states that nine CIA men comprised the crew of the C-118. Actually, the crew were all Air Force personnel, of whom three were Air Force officers detailed to the Agency.

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*The C-118 was flying on dead-reckoning because of weather. There is at least a suspicion that the plane may have been lured into Russia deliberately, as there is some evidence that the Soviet beacon at Batumi was overriding the Turkish beacon at Trabzon in Turkey where the plane was supposed to alter its course to Iran. All these facts were originally known to Colonel Prouty.

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[redacted]

Nevertheless, Prouty uses this incident to blame the CIA for entrusting "a most highly secret cargo" to this plane and crew when it could have used more secure means of transportation such as a commercial air carrier! The author looks upon this as "disregard for real professionalism," a subject with which he had, at most, a nodding acquaintance.

Chapter 18 on containment is largely a collection of errant nonsence, based on Prouty's thesis that by 1959 the Agency was about to run operations itself as it saw fit. He charges that, by combining secret intelligence and secret operations, Allen Dulles had created

> "a force of unequaled power ... an Agency, which by bypassing all of the barriers of the law and the NSC, and with the men, the money, and materials sufficient to carry out any operation anywhere in the world ... [left Allen Dulles] for all intents and purposes, in control of the foreign policy and clandestine military operational power of the United States for combat in the Cold War. ... Dulles had positioned CIA personnel and Agency-oriented disciples inconspicuously throughout the Government and in many instances had positioned the CIA throughout the business world and the academic community as well." (p. 339.)

Prouty states that the legislators and the Truman Administration which had created the CIA in the National Security Act in 1947 "were the same men who most staunchly protested against and denied to the Agency the right to become involved in clandestine operations." (p. 341.) This is self-contradictory and erroneous, and if the author doesn't know it, he certainly should. In fact, on the very next page he writes that "Congress expected that there would be clandestine operations; ... which the highest echelon of the Government would plan and direct." As the Agency's Legislative Counsel in daily touch with the Congress during the consideration of the CIA provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, this reviewer can state that the Congressional Committees approved the language of the Act in such a manner as to authorize the Agency's clandestine intelligence activities, although espionage was more in their focus in 1947 than covert action. Prouty's tortured thinking in trying to prove the illegallity of many of CIA's operations is nowhere more apparent than in this chapter. The full growth in the 50's of the world-wide Communist menace is to Prouty largely an invention of CIA's

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clandestine planners looking for something to do. His charge that we kept such matters secret from Congress is false, for CIA's oversight committees were kept well in the picture; that we kept such operations secret from the American people is inherent in the nature of security and clandestine operations, as Prouty would have been the first to admit at the time.

Prouty closes this chapter on one of his more sinister notes when he writes of the shootdown of the U-2 over Russia on 1 May, 1960 and the collapse of the Summit Conference in Paris that month. Of the flight Prouty darkly states that

> "The very fact that what was done could have been done so easily according to a sinister plan, not an accident or Soviet act, serves only to fuel the thought that it might have been done on purpose. Such a simple thing as failure to supply the plane with sufficient hydrogen for the flight could have resulted, just as it did, in the certain flame-out of the engine and the subsequent failure of the mission - or success of the mission, depending upon the secret intent of those who dispatched it. ... It would lead an observer, at least one who was very close to the inside activity, almost to believe that there is a great force somewhere that does not want to see a peace crusade succeed; or, to put it in active terms, that wants to promote professional anti-Communism and all that the term has come to mean during the past inglorious decade in Vietnam." (p. 354-355.)

Had Prouty been privy to the development of the U-2 and its operations, (which he was not, as it was handled by another group in the Pentagon, obviously to Prouty's annoyance), he would have known that hydrogen was not a factor in the U-2's flight. He seemingly ignores the fact that the U-2 was shot down. In this paragraph quoted above, he reaches perhaps the lowest ebb in his conspiratorial theories and again does much dishonor to himself.

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One could go through page after page of this unhappy tome picking out its egregious and unconscionable distortions and errors. Again for example:

- Prouty, on five separate occasions, cites as gospel the syndicated article which appeared over former President Truman's signature in the Washington Post of 21 December 1963 and which is highly critical of CIA. Readers of Studies in Intelligence are aware that this article was ghosted for President Truman, and that, in all probability, he never even saw it before publication.* In fact, Mr. Truman appeared to be astounded and denied the thrust of the article when it was shown to him a few months after publication by Allen Dulles. One cannot fault Prouty with not knowing that President Truman had not written this article. What one can fault Prouty for is his happy acceptance of the Truman statement as gospel, and his exploitation and use of it to blackguard the CIA when he should have realized from his personal experience that the "Truman" article did not comport with the facts. He has not been alone in these efforts, for he joins a motley, ill-informed group of critics. But, from his official position, Prouty was in a "privileged-position" to know better.

- In Prouty's references to alleged CIA failures involved in the 1958 revolt against Sukarno in Indonesia, he writes that these operations were under the personal direction of the DDP, Frank Wisner, and for their failure, "Wisner was relieved of duty with the Agency." This statement, is, of course, untrue and does disservice to the memory of an extraordinarily fine officer to whom this country owes much. The fact of the matter is that Mr. Wisner left his position as DDP at the end of 1958 because of the very serious illness which ultimately cost him his life. As Prouty was active in his work with CIA at that time, it is almost certain that he would have known of Mr. Wisner's illness, and such a statement as he has made here is, at best, indecent as well as untrue.

- Prouty's characterization of Daniel Ellsberg as a "former CIA agent" also does the Agency no favors, as Ellsberg never worked for CIA. This is a fact that Prouty easily could have checked as it has come up before and been denied.

- Prouty's general allegations that CIA may in some way have been involved in the assassination of President Kennedy reflect the discredited mouthings of James Garrison, the New Orleans District Attorney, who has long tried to peddle this line with his sycophants. Such a charge does not even merit the dignity of a denial.

*See: Studies in Intelligence. Vol. 17, No. 3. Fall 1973, pp. 9-11.

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All of this leaves unanswered only the question of why Prouty should have written The Secret Team. The possible explanations for his personal animus against CIA are speculated on at the beginning of this review. Perhaps, he believed that the book would be a real money-maker-a better money-maker than a book which dealt kindly with CIA, which might not have sold well at the time during which he was writing. This reviewer feels that Prouty will go to great lengths to write a book he thinks will catch some prevailing wind and sell. He has sought to catch the current winds of detente, which proclaim that the Cold War may be over, by trying to show that the Cold War never existed; that it was a myth dreamed up by CIA men in the 50's who were trying to keep themselves in business. But Prouty forgets that during the regime of two Presidents he was very much a part of, and a hard worker in, these activities which he now seeks to demean and distort. Because he was such a part of these programs, which two Presidents and their highest advisors had approved, it ill-becomes him now, as a retired military officer, to shout mea culpa and use the "privileged-position" of which he boasts to try to make money by writing a "kiss-and-tell" book which he hopes will sell. Enough said.

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